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Abstract
During the 1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts to fight high and
persistent levels of unemployment.  Although these contracts have been widely used,
unemployment has remained about the same after fifteen years.  This paper builds a theoretical
model to reconcile these facts.  We analyse the labour market effect of the introduction of fixed-
term contracts and the firm’s choice of contracts are studied.  Permanent contracts are the
standard way to offer incentives, but fixed-term contracts are cheaper.  This generates an
externality, which can make employment higher in the system with only permanent contracts.
As a consequence, from a social point of view, the share of fixed-term contracts is too large.
Increases in the renewal rate of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts lead to higher
employment levels.  Finally, the model highlights the interactions between different rigidities in
the labour market.  Aggregate employment and the share of temporary contracts are affected in
the same way by the firing costs and the flexibility of wages.
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M ostEuropean countries are considered economies with highly regulated
labormarkets, particularlywhencomparedtotheU S. A tthesametime, it
is alsoawellknownfactthat, sincethemid-19 7 0s, Europehas hadmuch
higherunemploymentlevels thantheU S. Ithasoftenbeensuggestedthat
thedi¤erentdegreesof‡exibilityoftheirlabormarketscouldberesponsible
forthedi¤erences intheirlabormarketperformances. D espitetheongoing
debateonthepossiblecausesofEuropeanunemploymentand, inparticular,
onthepossiblee¤ectoflabormarket‡exibility,1 manyEuropeancountries
have already started to implementreforms in theirlabormarkets: more
‡exibleregulations havebeenintroducedto…ghthighandpersistentlevels
ofunemployment.
Typically, European labormarkets havebeen characterized byawide





amountoftime. Inaddition, formostcountries, thejobforwhichtheworker
ishiredwitha…xed-termcontractisnotrequiredtobeaseasonalone.2
Since theirintroduction, …xed-term contracts have been widely used.
T heseaccountformostnewjobs.3 M oresurprisingly, theyhavebeenusedfor
alltypesofjobsandoccupations.4 H owever, unemploymenthasremainedas
highasbeforethereforms. A tthesametime, thistypeofreformhascreated
atwo-tiersystemandthelabormarkethasbecomehighlysegmented.5 T his
1Forinstance, seeB ean(19 9 4) andL ayardetal. (19 9 1) forasurveyonunemployment
andJackmanetal. (19 9 6), N ickellandL ayard(19 9 8) andP iore(19 86) forthedebateon
labormarket‡exibility.
2SeeG rubbandW ells (19 9 3) andO ECD (19 9 3, 19 9 4and19 9 9 ) foradetaileddescrip-
tionof…xed-term contractsregulations inEurope.
3Forinstance, inSpain9 8% ofnewlyregisteredcontractsbetween19 86and19 9 2 were
…xed-term contracts (seeB entolilaandSaint-Paul, 19 9 2). InFrance, in19 9 2, 80% ofall
entrieswerehiringson…xed-termcontracts(seeG ouxetal., 2000).
4SeeO ECD (19 9 3).
5T heshareof…xed-term contracts inSpainhasgonefrom 11% to35% between19 83
and19 9 5. InFrance, ithasgonefrom3.3% to12% duringthisperiod. SeeO ECD (19 9 3).
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T he introduction of…xed-term contracts is analyzed in the frameworkof
ane¢ciencywagemodel. A s willbediscussed, this kindofmodelis best
suitedtoexaminethetwomaindi¤erencesbetween…xed-term andperma-
nentcontracts, namely, …ringcosts andcontractduration. H ighwages are
thestandardwaytoprovideincentiveswithpermanentcontracts, but…xed-
termcontractsarecheaper. T he…rm’schoiceofhiringwithonecontractor




contracts isnottheirwage, buttherenewalrateofthesecontracts intoper-
manentones. Fixed-termcontractsarechosenby…rmswhentheyarecheap
enough. B utthis impliesanexternalitywhichcanmakeaggregateemploy-
menthigherinasystemwithonlypermanentcontracts. Firmsdonottake
intoaccount, inthetwo-tiersystem, thattheincreaseinout‡owsfrom un-
employmentresultinhigherwagesforpermanentcontracts. Inthiscase, the
optimalrenewalrateof…xed-termcontractsfromthesocialpointofviewis
one. T hatis, employmentcanbeincreasedbyreducingthein‡owsbackto
unemployment.
T hereis agrowingliteratureontheimpactof…xed-term contracts on
severalaspectsofthelabormarket.7 Inrelationtothee¤ectsonaggregate
employment, theliteraturehasbeendominatedbypartialequilibriummodels
oflabordemand.8 T hesemodels havethesamecharacteristics as thoseof
labordemandwith …ringcosts.9 T heseareveryusefultounderstandthe
e¤ects ofthese…ringrestrictions on thedynamicfunctioningofthelabor
market. B utthee¤ectsonaggregateemploymentareambiguousandremain
inpartialequilibrium.
H ere, I choosean e¢ciencywagemodeltostudythe impactof…xed-
6InSpain, between19 8 7 and19 96, only11% of…xed-termcontractsareconvertedinto
permanentones(seeG üellandPetrongolo, 2000).
7 See, forexample, A guirregabiriaand A lonso-B orrego(19 9 9 ), A lba (19 9 4, 19 96and
19 9 8), B entolilaandD olado(19 9 4), G ouxetal. (2000), JimenoandToharia(19 9 3 and
19 9 6) andSaint-Paul(19 9 6).
8Exceptions ofthis are Cabrales and H openhayn (19 9 7 ) and A lonso-Borregoetal.
(19 9 9 ).
9 See, forexample, B entolila and Bertola (19 9 0), B entolila and Saint-Paul (19 9 4),
B ertola(19 9 2) andN ickell(19 7 8).
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term contracts onemploymentthroughtheire¤ectonwages.10 T his type
ofmodelnotonlyallows fore¤ects of…ringcosts onwages butitis also
possibletoconsiderabroadviewofemploymentprotectionlegislationand
notjustseverancepayments. In particular, dismissalcon‡ictswhichhave
beenblamedforbeingcostlycanbemodeledinasimpleway.
O neadditionalcharacteristicof…xed-term contracts is thattheydi¤er
in durationwith respecttopermanentcontracts. T he existingliterature
has notexplicitlytakenthis intoaccount. In acompetitivelabormarket,
theduration ofcontracts does notmatter. In an e¢ciencywagemodel,
durationofcontracts is an importantsourceofincentives. Studying…xed-
term contracts inane¢ciencywagemodelallows toexplicitlyaddress the
questionofhowincentivesmaybeprovidedinshortdurationcontracts. T his,
inturn, wouldanswerthepreviouslymentionedstrikingfactthat…xed-term
contracts areusedevenforjobswheredurationmatters. So, inthemodel,
theshareof…xed-termcontractsisendogenous.
T his paperhighlights thelinks betweendi¤erentrigidities in thelabor
market. Employmentandtheshareof…xed-term contracts area¤ected in
thesamewaybythe…ringcosts associatedwithpermanentcontracts and
the‡exibilityofwages in …xed-term contracts. T hemechanism bywhich
thecreationofemploymentand, moreprecisely, permanentemploymentare
discouragedisthecombinationoftheselasttwo. T heintroductionof…xed-
term contracts does notcompletelyremovethee¤ectof…ringcosts unless
thewages in…xed-termcontractsareperfectly‡exible. Forthisreason, two
extremesituationscouldgeneratehigheremploymentthanatwo-tiersystem
withunchanged…ringcosts andless thanperfectly‡exiblewages in …xed-
term contracts. O newouldbeasituationinwhichthewagesof…xed-term
contracts areveryhigh. In this system, permanentcontracts alonewould
generatehigheremploymentthanthetwo-tiersystem. T heothersituation
wouldbethecasewithperfectly‡exiblewages in…xed-term contracts. In
thiscase, fullemploymentwouldarise.11
T hepaperisorganizedasfollows. Insection2 themodelis introduced.
First, I consideraneconomywhereonlypermanentcontracts areavailable
and…ringcostsreduceemployment(section2.1). T hen, theintroductionof
contractswithno…ringcosts(…xed-termcontracts) insucheconomyisana-
10InSaint-Paul(19 9 6), chapter7 , this isalsostudiedalthoughitisassumedthat…xed-
term workers arealreadydi¤erentex-antefrom permanentworkers andarepaidatthe
competitivewage. T his “duallabormarket” approachdoes notallowtoanalyzewhyin
Europemostoftheout‡owsfromunemploymentare…xed-termcontractsnortherenewals
of…xed-termcontracts intopermanentcontracts.











permanent(PC) orwitha…xed-term contract(temporarycontract, T C).12
Contractsdi¤erinlengthand…ringcosts. Tomakethemodelas simpleas
possible, assumethatTCslastoneperiodandthatPCscanlastanin…nite
numberofperiods. A workercanonlybehiredonceonaT C bythesame
…rm. T hus, aftertheoneperiodTC, the…rmhastodecidewhethertorenew
theworkerintoaPC orto…rehim.13 A T C is goingtoberenewedintoa
PCwithan(endogenous) probabilityR .
T he modelis set in discrete time and workers decide in each period
whetherornottoshirk. A s inShapiroandStiglitz, aworker’se¤ortisnot
perfectlyobservableandthereisadetectiontechnologythatcatchesshirking
workers(nevererroneously)withsomeprobabilityq (whereq < 1). W hena
workeris foundshirking, heis …redandbecomesunemployed. Tosimplify,
supposethatunemploymentbene…ts are zero. In this model, allworkers
areidentical.14 Inaddition, workersareriskneutralandtheirinstantaneous
utilityfunctionis: U(w ;e) = w ¡e;wherew isthewageande isthee¤ort.
W orkers’e¤ortchoices arediscrete. Iftheyshirk, theyexpendzeroe¤ort
andproduction is zero. T hee¤ortrequiredtoperform inthejob is e > 0 .
T hee¤ortisthesameinanycontractbecausethereisonlyonetypeofjob.
Everyperiod, workerschoosethelevelofe¤ortthatmaximizestheirutil-
ity actualized atrate r. L etV ijt, i = fs;ng; j= fP;Tg bethepresent
12T he terms …xed-term and temporary contract(TC) willbe used interchangeably
throughoutthepaper.
13T his is onlyasimplifyingassumption. A ssumingthat…xed-term contracts can be
renewedintofurther…xed-term contracts does notchangetheresults because, as itwill
beshown, itwillbenecessarythatatsomepoint…xed-term contractsgetrenewedinto
permanentones.
14T herefore, I amnotconsideringthepossibleuseofT C toobserveworker’scharacter-
istics. I implicitlyassumethatthe“trial” periodofthecontracthasalreadyelapsedand
has beenusefulforthismatter. A s aconsequence, thereisnoadverseselectionproblem








A ssumethatthelegislation …xes aseverancepaymentforpermanentcon-




…rm has tocompensate…redworkers (incaseofredundancies orshocks).16
SinceI focusonhiringdecisionsof…rms, themodellingofthesecondcase




consideredan“unfair” case(seeO ECD , 19 9 9 ). Permanentworkershavethe
righttosueemployers in everycaseofdismissal, butworkers with aTC
cannotdoitwhentheyarenotrenewed.17 T hee¢ciencywagemodelallows
toconsiderdismissalcon‡ictsexplicitly. Insuchacontext, con‡ictsbetween
employers andemployees canariseinrelationtothe(unobservable) e¤ort.
A doublemoralhazardcanarise, where…rms usedisciplinarycases when
facingredundancies totry toavoid paying…ringcosts andworkers deny
anydisciplinarycasetotrytogetcompensation. T his implies thatcourt
resolutionswillbeimperfect, giventheinformationproblem. Consequently,
disciplinarycases arenotcostless, theycostd C , whereC is theseverance
paymentand d is theprobabilitythatthecourtdeclares it“unfair”. G iven
this informationproblem, d > 0 .18
15I am consideringthatindemnities, whenthecontractexpires, arezero, whichis the




1 7 A smentionedbefore, beingTC su¢cientlyshort, temporaryworkersareactuallynot
renewedratherthanbeing…redforotherreasons. T hisimpliesthat, inpractice, temporary
workerscanneversueemployers incourt.
18 T his is asimpleversionofG üell(2000). T here, redundancies costzC , wherez¸d
because…rms canhavegreaterchances toproofatrulydisciplinarycasethanahidden
redundancy. A s shown, this costis neutralonemployment. T herefore, forsimplicity, in
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2.1.2 N on-shirkingcondition
Inthis section, I analyzethewageworkersmustbepaidinordertoprovide
theoptimale¤ortonthejob. SincePCs areassumedtohaveastationary
form,19 itispossibletoomittimeindices. W henaworkerdoesnotshirkin
aPC, hegetsautilityequalto
V nP = wP¡e + 11 + r [(1¡b)V nP + b(VU + C )]; (1)
wherewP isthewageofaPCandVU isthepresentvalueofutilityofan
unemployedworker. IftheworkerdecidestoshirkinaPC, hisutilityis
V sP = wP+
1
1 + r
[(1¡b¡q)V sP+ b(VU + C )+ q(VU + d C )]: (2)
A s in Shapiroand Stiglitz (19 84), shirkingsaves thecurrentdisutility
ofe¤ortbutitimplies ahigherriskofbecomingunemployed. T his risk
is proportionaltotheprobabilityofbeingcaughtshirking(q). Firingcosts
alsoin‡uencethee¤ortdecisionherebecauseoftheimperfectcourtdecisions.
W ithprobability d ; shirkingworkersmaybecompensatedwithaseverance
payment. T hisreducesthecostofshirking.
T heworkerwillchoosetoprovideane¤orte ifandonly ifV np ¸ V sp .
U singequations(1)and(2), theN SCP informofutilitiescanbewrittenas
V nP¡VU ¸ e(1 + r)q + d C ´K: (3)
T hisconditionstatesthatinordertoprovideincentives, thepunishment
oflosingajob mustbeatleastequaltotheopportunitycostofshirking,
denotedbyK . Substitutingthis conditionintoequation(1), theincentive-
compatiblewageinaPCcanbewrittenas









term). ForC = 0 , thisconditionis thesameas intheoriginalShapiroand
Stiglitz (19 84). In ordertoprovide incentives, wages need toexceed the
reservationwagebyarent, K:T hisrentis proportionaltotheopportunity
costofnotshirkingweightedbytheterm (r + b). T hehigherthediscount
this paperI assumethatz=1 .
19 FordiscussionsofpossibleformsofbondingseeKatz(19 86).
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rate, themoreaworkervalues thesavingofe¤orttoday. T hehigherthe
probabilityofbeing…redforotherreasons than (truly) shirkingcases (i.e.
shocks), themorecostlyitistoexpende¤orttoday.
ForC > 0 , itispossibletodistinguishtwotypesofe¤ectsof…ringcosts:
those directlyrelatedwith the incentiveproblem andthosethatarenot.
Firingcostsa¤ecttheincentiveproblem becausetotheextentthat(truly)




A tthesametime, independentlyoftheincentiveproblem, theintroduc-
tionofmandatedseverancepaymentsallowstheemployertoreducethewage
exactlybythesameproportionthatthepresentdiscountedutilityofanem-




IfthePC satis…estheN SCP, thatis, iftheworkeris paidatleast bwP,
orifbeingunemployeda is su¢ciently largepunishment(V nP > VU), the
workerwillchoosetoexpendthee¤orte. L etVP betheexpectedutilityof
holdingaPC inequilibrium. T he…rmchoosestheminimumwageatwhich
theworkerwillnotshirk, sothatinequilibrium the N SCP is bindingand
VP = V nP = V sP:
M anycountrieshavelegalminimumwageconstraints. Implicitly, I amas-
sumingherethatthelegislatedminimumwagewouldbeaslackconstraint.
T his willbecomemorerelevantin thenextsectionwheretemporarycon-
tracts, whichwillbepaidattheminimumwagelevel, areconsidered.
2.1.3 H iringdecisions







f(LPt)¡wPLPt¡bC LP(t¡1)i 1(1 + r)t;
whereLP is employmentinthesystem withonlyPCsandf(LP) is aCR S
production functionwith f0(LP) = m :In steadystate,21 labordemand is
20T hise¤ectof…ringcosts isthesameasthatproposedbyL azear(19 9 0).













wage. T hekeymarketvariablethatdetermines …rm individualbehavioris






G iventhattheN SCP issatis…ed, inequilibrium
rVU = aK: (6)
Substitutingequation(6) intoequation(4), thee¢ciencywagecurvein
equilibriumcanbewrittenasbw ¤P = e¡ bC1 + r + K (r + b+ a)(1 + r) : (7 )
Inequilibrium, theincentive-compatiblewageishigherthehighertheexit
ratefrom unemployment. T his resultis alsofound in ShapiroandStiglitz
(19 84). T herentlinkedwiththeincentiveproblem isweightedbya because
thehighera; thelessbecomingunemployedisapenalty.
A ggregateemployment, LP, is derivedfromthesteadystate‡owcondi-
tion. Insteadystate, in‡owstounemploymentaregivenbybLP. O ut‡ows
aregivenby a(N ¡LP), where N is thetotalofworkers in theeconomy.
T hus






Combiningequations (5) and(7 ), theequilibrium out‡owratefrom un-
employment, a¤, canbewrittenas
m = e + K








sameproportionastheincreasedshadowcostoflabor(seeL azear19 9 0).
H owever, inthismodel, evenif…ringcostsarefullyreceivedbyworkers,






T heaggregateN SCP canalsobewrittenintermsoftheunemployment
rate, u. R eplacingequation (8) intoequation (7 ), this condition can be
writtenas
bw ¤P = e¡ bC1 + r + K (r + bNN ¡LP)(1 + r) = e¡ bC1 + r + K (r + b=u)(1 + r) ; (11)
whereu= (N ¡Lp)=N .
A sinShapiroandStiglitz(19 84), thisexpressionshowstheincompatibil-
ityoffullemploymentwithincentives.22 T hisexpressioncanberepresented





contracts. PCs lookexactlythesameas intheprevious section. TCs are
analyzedinthefollowingsection.
2.2.1 N on-shirkingconditioninatemporarycontract
SinceTCs haveanonstationaryform andthis is preciselywhatwilldrive
theresults, itisconvenienttousetimeindicestostartanalyzingthem. T he
incentiveproblem toexamine is thatofaworkerholdingaTC atperiod
twhichcanberenewedintoaPC atperiod (t+ 1)withprobability R :If
thecontractis notrenewed, theworkerbecomes unemployed. T hus, the
22A s itwillbe shown, this is notnecessarilythecasewhen …xed-term contracts are
introduced.
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incentiveproblem at(t+ 1) is exactlythesameas in aPC. So, thenon-
shirkingconstraintofaTC at(t+ 1); N SC T(t+ 1); is justthenon-shirking
constraintofaPC, i.e. N SC T(t+ 1) = N SCP.
ProvidedthattheN SC T(t+ 1) issatis…ed, thenexpectedpresentdiscounted
utilityofbeingemployedwithaT Catperiodtofnotshirkingandofshirking
isgivenrespectivelyby
V nTt= wTt¡e + 11 + r
h
R (1¡b)VP(t+ 1) + [b+ (1¡R )(1¡b)]VU(t+ 1)i (12)
and





[b+ (1¡R )(1¡b¡q)+ q]VU (t+ 1)
#
; (13)
wherewT isthewageoftheT CandR istheprobabilityinwhichtemporary
contractsgetrenewedintopermanentones.
A gain, shirkingimplies savingthedisutilityofe¤orttodaybutimplies
ahigherriskofbecomingunemployedtomorrow. M oreover, in aTC, not
beingcaughtshirkingis anecessarycondition inordertoberenewed into
aPC. Ithas beenassumedthatallworkers areidenticalandthatthereis
a“hiddenaction” problem butnota“hidden information” one. T hus, in
TCs, expenditureofe¤ortdoes notgiveanyadditionalinformationabout
theworker’s characteristics thatcouldin‡uencerenewal. But, expenditure
ofe¤ortinaTCmakesrenewalmorelikelythanwhenshirking. N otshirking
reducestheprobabilitytobecomeunemployeddirectly.
A …rstimportantremarkis thatifthere is norenewalofTC intoPC
attheendofperiodt, thenshirkingis always strictlypreferred(ifR = 0 ,
then V nTt¡V sTt= ¡e < 0 ). T heideabehindthis is verysimple: ifaworker
always becomes unemployedindependentlyofthee¤ortexpended, thereis




I am consideringanextremecasewhereT Cs lastonlyoneperiodand
thus thewagepaiddoes nota¤ectincentives. B utstill, inamoregeneral
case, eveniftheT Cwaslonger, whenunemploymentiscertainattheendof
thecontract, wageshavenoincentiverole. Instead, theprospectsofrenewal
do. W hen itis uncertainforaworkerthathewillkeep thejob tomorrow,







V nTt¡V sTt¸0 ifandonlyifR (VP(t+ 1)¡VU(t+ 1))¸ e(1 + r)q : (14)
T hisconditionstatesthatincentivesinaTCcanbegivenbytherenewal
rateofTC intoPCand/orbytherentassociatedwithholdingaPC.Incen-
tives givenwithfuturewages is thestandardideaofe¢ciencywages. T he
renewalrateis alsorelatedtothe incentiveproblem inasimilarway: for





incentiveproblem. A ndviceversa. H owever, forgiven permanentwages,
therenewalratecannotbezero, as thoughtintuitively. A lso, forgiven R ,
workers inaPC mustenjoysomerent, as in thestandarde¢ciencywage
models. Figure2 representstheN SC Ttinthespace(R ;VP¡VU).
A nincentive-compatibleTCmustsatisfytheN SC TtandtheN SCP. A s
seen in the previous section, workers in PCs are paid theminimum rent
compatiblewithincentives, thatis, theN SCP isbinding. T hisreducesthe
possiblevaluesofR to
R ¸ e(1 + r)
e(1 + r)+ qd C
= R ¤: (15)
Figure3representsthetwonon-shirkingconstraintsofaTC.T hethicker
lineinthegraphrepresentsthecombinationsof(R ;VP¡VU)wherethetwo
N SC are satis…ed. A nd R ¤ is therenewalrateforwhich both N SC are
binding. N otethatforthecasewhere d > 0 , R ¤ < 1. T hatis, if…ring
costs arenon-neutralon permanentemployment, theminimum incentive-
compatiblerenewalrateislessthanone.
Toconcludethis section, ithas beenfoundthatincentives inaTC are
providedwith acombination ofanon-zerorenewalrate intoaPC anda
non-zerorentpaid inaPC. T herentis theminimalrentcompatiblewith
incentives givenbythe N SCP, andtherenewalrateR cantakeanyvalue
within the N SC Ttcompatiblewith such rent, thatis R ¸ R ¤. L etthis
conditionbeN SC T:L etVT betheexpectedutilityinequilibrium ofaTC.
SinceVT satis…es theN SC T ; then VT = V nT :Inthenextsectionthe…rm’s











incentiveconstraints. L et¦ itbethepresentdiscountedvalueofmarginal
pro…tswithtypeicontract(i= T;P). T hatis




s:t:N SC itandN SC i(t+ 1)
where¦ i(t+ 1) =
8><>: (1¡b)(1¡R )¦ T(t+ 1) + (1¡b)R ¦P(t+ 1) fori= T¡bC + (1¡b)¦P(t+ 1) fori= P
Firmsalwaysgetthenetproductinstantaneouslywithanytypeofcon-
tract. T hen, withaPC, the…rm incurs the…ringcostifthereis aredun-
dancy, otherwisethecontractcontinues. TCsendafteroneperiod. Ifthere
isashock, thecontractdoesnotcontinueandthis isnotcostlyforthe…rm.
O therwise, thecontractcontinues, becomingapermanentone(withproba-
bilityR ) orrestartingwithanewworkerwithanotherTC (withprobability
1¡R ).
L emma1. The optimalcontractin a two-tiersystem is a …xed-term
contractthatisrenewedintoapermanentcontractwithprobabilityR .
Proof: Itiseasytonotethatthepermanentcontractproblem (i= P) is
justthesubproblemat(t+ 1)ofthetemporarycontractproblem (i= T)at
t. SincethewageinaTC, wT , has noincentiverole(implyingthatitwill
notbehigherthanthee¢ciencywageinaPC)andthereareno…ringcosts,
the…rmcannotbemadeworseo¤ bystartingwitha…xed-termcontract.23
T herefore, theoptimalstrategyforthe…rm is tostartwithaTC and
afteroneperiodrenewitintoaPCwithsomeprobabilityR . T herenewal
rateischosentomaximizethepresentdiscountedvalueofmarginalpro…tsof
aT C (¦ T) subjecttotheN SC T . T he…rmalsochoosesthewagetobepaid




(1) where w T is ‡exibleandthe…rm onlyhas toconsideraparticipation
constraintand(2)wherethereissomelegislationthatsetsthewageatleast





¦ T(R ;w T)
s:t:
8>><>>:
R ¤·R ·18><>: case(1): VT ¸VUcase(2): w T ¸wmin
T heresolutionofthisproblemleadstothefollowingproposition:
Proposition1 Ifwages in…xed-term contracts areperfectly‡exible, then
the…rm is indi¤ erentamonganyincentive-compatiblerenewalrateof…xed-
term contracts intopermanentcontracts, thatis R 2 (R ¤;1):B utifthere
areminimumwagerestrictions, thenthe…rm choosestheminimum renewal
rate, thatis, R ¤:
Proof: seeappendix.
T he idea behind this resultis simple. Ifwages in TCs are perfectly
‡exible, allthee¤ectsof…ringcosts onthewagesettingofthePC canbe
undonewiththewageofthe…rstperiodwhiletheworkerisinaT C.T husthe
…rmisindi¤erentamonganyrenewalratebecausepro…tscanalwaysbekept
constant. Inthiscase, theeconomywouldbeatfullemployment.25 Instead,
ifwagesarenotperfectly‡exible, theoptimalrateofrenewalistheminimum
compatiblewithincentives, thatisR ¤, whereR ¤< 1:T hemechanismthatis
preventinghigherrenewalratesisthenon-neutrale¤ectof…ringcostsonthe
e¢ciencywage. Figure4represents theiso-pro…ts curves forthetwocases
inthespace(R , VP¡VU ):
Backtotheinitialquestion, notethatthisresultprovidesaninteresting
andparadoxicalexplanationoftheuseofTCs: whentemporarycontracts
arevery“cheap”, the…rm isactuallyindi¤erentamongTCsorPCs. W hile
whentemporarycontracts aremore“expensive”, the…rm actuallychooses
theminimum shareofPCgiventheincentiveconstraints.
24A smentioned, thelegislatedminimumwagewouldbeaslackconstraintintheworld






In this section I derivethelabordemandfortheoptimaltypeofcontract
describedinProposition1 (case2).26Firmsmaximizeemploymentgiventhe





system inwhich onlyPCswereavailable, I denotewith “e” thevalueof
variablesthatwerealsopresentinthatsystem (i.e. LP;w p;a;VU ). T huseLPt= (1¡b)eLP(t¡1) + R ¤(1¡b)LT(t¡1) 8t;t= 1;:::;+ 1 (16)







f(eLt)¡wminLTt¡wPeLPt¡bC eLp(t¡1)i 1(1 + r)t
subjectto(16).
T hesteadystatelabordemandisgivenby









r + b+ R ¤(1¡b):
In a two-tiersystem, themarginalproductoflaboris equalized toa
weightedsum ofthemarginalcostofaTC andthemarginalcostofaPC.
T heweightscorrespondtotheactualizedshareofTC, (¯ );andPC, (1¡¯);
respectively. A moredetaileddiscussionon¯ isdoneinthenextsection.
2.2.4 M arketequilibrium
A s before, thekeymarketvariableis eVU . Inatwo-tiersystem, allcontracts
startwithaTC.T herefore, eVU = ear + eaVT: (18)
26A smentioned, thereisfullemploymentincase1.
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1 + r + ea "(wmin¡e)+ (1¡b)(1 + r) e(1 + r)q # ; (19 )
wheretheterm e(1 + r)=qdenotestheimportanceoftheshirkingproblem in
aT C, thatis, R ¤(VP¡VU );givenby(14).
N ow, goingbacktoequation(4), thee¢ciencywageofaPCinatwo-tier
system isgivenbyew¤P = e¡ bC1 + r + K (r + b)1 + r + ea(1 + r + ea) "(wmin¡e)+ e(1¡b)q # : (20)
A s before, eL is derivedfrom thesteadystate‡ows conditions27 . L et eL
betotalemploymentin thetwo-tiersystem, which equals temporaryem-
ployment, LT plus permanentemployment, eLP: In‡ows andout‡ows into
employmenthavebasicallythesamestructureas in thesystem onlywith
PCs. T herearealsothe‡ows from therenewalandnon-renewals ofTC.
Figure5 representsallthese‡ows.
Inthesteadystate, theout‡owfrom unemploymentisgivenby ea(N ¡eL) workers. T he in‡owtounemploymentcomes from thosewhose TC is
notrenewed, (1¡b)(1¡R ¤)LT , andfrom allthosewholosttheirjobs for
exogenousreasons, beL. T husea(N ¡LT ¡eLP) = (1¡R ¤)(1¡b)LT + b(LT + eLP): (21)
A tanytime, aproportion R ¤ofthoseTCsthatarenot…nishedforex-
ogenousreasons, arerenewedintoPCs, whileaproportionbofthosealready
inPCsbecomeunemployed. So









b+ (1¡b)R ¤ (23)




Combining(17 ) and(20), theequilibriumout‡owrateofunemployment
inatwo-tiersystem, ea¤, canbewrittenas







(1 + r + ea¤)Ãwmin¡e + e(1¡b)q ! # :
(24)
G oingbacktothee¢ciencywageinthetwo-tiersystem, itispossibleto
express(20) intermsoftheunemploymentrate. T hisallowstodothefollow-
ingremark. R eplacing(22) into(21), theout‡owratefrom unemployment
canbewrittenas ea = ®(1¡eu)eu ;
whereeu= (N ¡LT¡eLP)=N istheunemploymentrateinthetwo-tiersystem.
So, thee¢ciencywagecurveinequilibrium isgivenby
ew ¤P = e¡ bC1 + r + K (r + b)(1 + r) + ®(1¡eu)® (1¡eu)+ eu(1 + r)Ãwmin¡e + e(1¡b)q ! :
(25)
R emark1 Fullemploymentisnotincompatiblewiththeincentiveproblem
in atwo-tiersystem as itis in the system withonlyone type ofcontract
(as in ShapiroandStiglitz, 19 84). Butitwouldalways be a “mixed” full
employment, i.e. fullemploymentinwhichTC andPC coexist.
T hiscanbeseendirectlyfromexpression(25): theincentive-compatible
wageforzerounemploymentrateis …nite.28 T his is insharp contrastfrom
thesituationwithonlyPCs(seeequation11). H owever, thisfullemployment
wouldbe‘mixed’, inotherwords, withbothtypesofcontractscoexisting. In
thiscase, fullemploymentiscompatiblewithincentives. T hereasonisthat
eachtypeofemploymentgivesincentivestotheother: temporaryworkersare
motivatedbythepossibilityofgettingabettercontract, thatis, apermanent
contract. A ndpermanentworkers aremotivatedtoworkinordertoavoid
restartingwitha…xed-termcontract.29
28From Proposition1, wehavethatincase1, foranycombinationof(wT ;R ), a¡! 1 :
29 A lthough temporarywages are lowerthan those in a PC, temporaryworkers get
incentivesfromtherenewalprospects intohigherutilitycontracts. FiringcostsmakeTC
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L emma2. T he equilibrium conditions foreach system dependon the
leveloftheminimumwage.
Proof: seeappendix.
Proposition2 Forwmin> m , thesystemwithonlypermanentcontracts is
theonlyequilibrium. Forwmin< m , thetwo-tiersystem is theonlyequilib-
rium. Forwmin= m , anyofthetwosystemscanbeanequilibrium.
Proof: seeappendix
T he ideabehindthis resultis thatgiventhatin thesystem withonly
PCsworkers arepaidtheirmarginalproduct, whentheminimum wageis
abovem , T CsaremorecostlythanPCsso…rmswouldo¤erPCsonly. O n
thecontrary, when theminimum wage is belowm , T Cs are “cheap” and






ofthelabormarket. Comparing(24)with(10), itis possibletodistinguish
twoe¤ectsatplay. O ntheonehand, forgivenwages, employmentishigher
inatwo-tiersystem duetoacompositione¤ect. T heweight¯ corresponds
toanactualizedshareofT Cgivenby® (equation23).30 O ntheotherhand,
worsenotonlybecause…redworkers arenotpaidan indemnity, butalsobecausethey
makeR ¤< 1 . Iftherewereno…ringcosts, thenR ¤=1 andtheonlypotentialdi¤erence
betweencontractswouldbetheirwage. Inthiscase, anupwardslopingwagepro…lewould
notgenerallybeaperfectsubstitutefora…rst-bestcontractwithanupfrontfee, asargued
byA kerlofandKatz(19 8 9 ).
30Ifr=0 ;thenf0(eL )=®wmin+ (1¡®)·wp+ bC1 + r¸ . A lso, ifr=+1 ;then f0(eL )=
wmin. T hatis, if…rms arepatient, theyequalizethemarginalproductoflabortothe
averagecostoflabor. In theoppositeextremecase, …rms onlyperceivethecostofthe
presentlaborforcewhichisalwaysholdingaTC.
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ew¤P isnotnecessarilyequalto bw¤P:T hisalsohasane¤ectonemployment. If
wagesofPCarehigherinatwo-tiersystemthaninasystemwithonlyPCs,
ceterisparibus, employmentwouldbelowerinatwo-tiersystem.




is. From Proposition 1, the shareofT C in the economy is constantfor
any(positive) wminand, therefore, increases oftheminimum wagearenot
compensated byareduction ofTCs. A tthe sametime, thedi¤erence in
permanentcontractwages inthetwosystems alsodepends onthelevelof
minimumwages. T hehighertheminimumwage, thehigherthepermanent
wageinthetwo-tiersystem.31 T his, inturn, alsoreducesemploymentinthe
two-tiersystem.
So, thee¤ectofTConemploymentdependscruciallyonthelevelofmin-
imumwages. T herefore, atwo-tiersystem doesnotguaranteehigherlevels
ofemployment. M oreprecisely, thefollowingpropositioncanbeformulated:
Proposition3 T hereexistsavaluew¤minsuchthat: forwmin > w¤min, em-
ploymentis higherinthesystem withonlypermanentcontracts. M oreover,
there is arangeofvalues ofwmin, namely wmin2 [w¤min;m ], forwhichthe











N ow, thequestionis: Isitalwaysthecasethatasystemisanequilibrium
whenemploymentishigherinthatsystem?T hestudyofthisquestiongives
thefollowingproposition:
Proposition4 W hen the system withonlyPC is an equilibrium, employ-
mentisalwayshigherinsuchasystem. Butintherangeofminimumwages,











more, increasingea, andthereforeincreasing ew p somuchthattotalemploy-
mentturnsouttobelowerthanitwouldhavebeenwithonlyPCs .
2.3.2 E¤ectsof…ringcosts inatwo-tiersystem
Inthesystem withonlyPCs , thee¤ectof…ringcostswas clear-cut: their
non-neutrale¤ectonthewagesettingreducedemployment. G iventheresults
onemploymentinatwo-tiersystemfoundinthelastsection, itisinteresting
toanalyzethee¤ectsof…ringcostsinthetwo-tiersystem. T hatis, are…ring
costsneutralinatwo-tiersystemdespitethefactthatthesignofemployment
isambiguous?
Inthetwo-tiersystem, …ringcostsalsoreduceemployment, butitis im-
portanttodistinguishtwoe¤ects. First, theyreduceemploymentjustlike
inthesystem withonlyPCs becauseoftheirpositivee¤ectonpermanent
contractwages. N otethatthise¤ectislowerthanintheothersystem since
theproportionofpermanentemploymentis in generallower. Second, …r-
ingcosts alsoplay arole in thedetermination ofthe renewalrate. T he
highertherentinaPC(duetothee¤ectof…ringcosts), thelowerincentive-
compatiblerenewalrate, R ¤, needs tobe.32 T his reduces theabovee¤ect.





T heintuitionis thattheincentiveproblem imposesaminimum propor-
tionofpermanentemploymentandthatitscostscanonlybecompensated
attheexpenseoflowerwages fortemporaryworkers. But, as itis shown,
thereisnopositivetemporarywagethatcanundothee¤ectof…ringcosts.
32T his e¤ectcouldmake insiders holdingaPC push forhigher…ringcosts and…rms
acceptitsinceitwouldallowthem too¤erlowerrenewalratestonewentrantswithTC.
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T hismeans thattheintroductionofTC mayimplyhigheremployment
despitethefactthatitdoesnotremovetheine¢ciencyof…ringcostscom-
pletely. W hathappens thenwhen thenon-neutralitye¤ectof…ringcosts
is reduced? T hatis, whathappens if d is reduced? In the system with
onlyPCs, employmentincreases. Inthetwo-tiersystem, employmentalso
increasesaswellastherenewalrateofT Cs. So, thelabormarketislessseg-
mented. T hisexplainswhytheintroductionofT CskeepingPCsunchanged
(thatis, leavingthenon–neutrale¤ects of…ringcosts unchanged) leads to
asubstitutionofT CsforPCswithoutanecessaryincreaseoftotalemploy-
ment. T herefore, theremovalofthenon-neutralitye¤ectsof…ringcosts is
ane¢cientpolicy. W hetheritwouldhavemoreimpacte¤ectinonesystem
ortheotherdepends again in thelevelofminimum wages thatdetermine
thedi¤erenceinemploymentinbothsystems.
2.4 W elfareA nalysis
Finally, itis importanttoknowiftheequilibrium allocationis constrained
Paretoe¢cientornot. T hesocialplannermaximizesaggregatewelfare
W = LP(VP+ ¦ P)+ LT(VT + ¦ T)+ (N ¡L)VU:




LP(wP¡e)+ LT(w T ¡e)+ LP(m ¡wP)+ LT(m ¡w T);
whichinturnequals
LP(m ¡e)+ LT(m ¡e) = L(m ¡e):
thatis, totaloutputminusthesocialcostofproduction(thee¤ort, e).
T hus, thecentralplannerisonlyconcernedwithtotalemployment. T here-
fore, from Proposition4, themarketoutcomeis notalways e¢cient. M ore
precisely, thetwo-tiersystem isnotalwayssociallyoptimal. So, whatisthe
sociallyoptimalrenewalrateofT Cs?
Thesocialplannermaximizesemploymentinatwo-tiersystemsubjectto
theN SCsandtheminimumwageconstraint. M oreover, thesocialallocation








R ¸R ¤ (¸ 1)
R ·1 (¸ 2 )




1 + r + a
"
wT ¡e + R (1¡b)K1 + r
#
¸0 (¸ 3)
m eL(a;R )¡w TLT(a;R )¡ÃwP+ bC1 + r ! eLP(a;R )¸0 (¸ 4 )
w T ¸wmin(¸ 5)
T heresolutionofthisproblemleadstothefollowingproposition:
Proposition6T hereexists avalue w ¤¤minsuchthat: forwmin > w ¤¤min, the
sociallyoptimalrenewalrateof…xed-term contracts is R = 1, wherew¤¤min>
w¤min:
Proof: seeappendix.




thantheprivateone. T heintuitionisthefollowing. Firmsdonottakeinto
accountthatwhentheyincreasetherateofrenewal, permanentwageswill
fall. T hus, theychosetheminimum incentive-compatiblerenewalratebe-
causetheytakeasgivenpermanentwages.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I haveanalyzedthe introduction of…xed-term contracts in
aneconomywhere…ringcosts reduceemployment. T hemodelhas shown
thatthechoiceof…xed-termcontractsisunderstandableeveninacontextof
e¢ciencywages. T heideaisthattherenewalrateintopermanentcontracts
has an incentiverole. In addition, renewalrates arelowerthehigherthe
(negative) e¤ectof…ringcostsonemployment.
Itisoftenstatedthattheargumentforintroducing…xed-term contracts
isthatthis is“thepricetopaytogetfullemployment”. B uthigheremploy-
mentattheexpenseofsegmentationofthelabormarketonlyarisesifwages





T his can explainwhythe introduction of…xed-term contracts keeping
permanentcontracts unchanged(thatis, leavingthenon–neutrale¤ectsof
…ringcosts unchanged) leads toasubstitutionof…xed-term forpermanent
contractswithoutanecessaryincreaseoftotalemploymentas itis seen in
someEuropeancountries.
M oreover, fromthesocialpointofview, marketsegmentationistoolarge.
H igherrenewalratesof…xed-term contracts intopermanentcontracts lead







Proof. I …rstanalyzecase1 andthencase2.²Incase 1, the…rm chooses topaythelowestwagethatsatis…es the
participationconstraint, thatisw T suchthatVT = VU:U singequation(12),
inequilibrium, thiswageisgivenby




So, w T = wT(R ;VU ;VP):
T herefore,













d ¦ T(R ;w T(R ;¢);:)
@R
!
= sign ((¦ P¡¦ T)+ (VP¡VU )):
T he…rstelement(¦ P¡¦ T) showsthedirecte¤ectoftherenewalrate
ontemporarypro…ts: everycontractrenewedgives ¦P insteadof¦ T . T he
second elementshows the indirecte¤ectofthe renewalrate through the





ofamatchwiththecurrentworkeronaPCoronaTC, thatis, Si= ¦ i+ Vi
fori= fP;Tg:
sign ((¦ P¡¦ T)+ (VP¡VU)) = sign (SP¡ST + VT ¡VU );where
SP = m ¡e + 11 + r [bVU + (1¡b)SP]and
ST = m ¡e + 11 + r [bVU + (1¡b)R SP+ (1¡b)(1¡R )(VU + ¦ T)]:
T hedi¤erenceinsurplusamongthedi¤erentcontractsdependscrucially
ontherenewalrateandonthefactthatT C canonlybeusedonceonthe
sameworker. Iftherenewalrateis 1, thenT CsandPCsgeneratethesame
totalsurplus. T heirdi¤erenceisjustinthedistributionofthissurplusamong
currentworkerandemployer. Secondly, thefactthatTCscanonlybeused
onceonthesameworkerimplies achangeofutility(from holdingaTC to
becomingunemployed) forcurrentworkersholdingaTCwhenevertheyare
notrenewed. T herefore
sign (SP¡ST) = sign [(1¡b)(1¡R )(VT ¡VU )]and
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sign((¦P¡¦ T)+ (VP¡VU)) = sign [(1¡b)(1¡R )(VT ¡VU)]:
T hefactthat…rmchoosesthewagesuchthatVT = VU , impliesthat
sign
Ã




T herefore, the…rm is indi¤erentamonganyincentive-compatibleR .
N otethatfromthewholeeconomypointofviewthetwotypesofcontracts
alsogeneratethesamesurplusbecausewhenaT C isnotrenewed, the…rm
startsanewonewithanotherworker. T heintuitionforthis issimple: there
is onlyonetypeofjob in theeconomyandworkers areallhomogeneous.
G lobally, thedi¤erentcontracts justdetermine adi¤erentdistribution of




@¦ T(R ;w T)
@R
!
= sign (¦ P¡¦ T):
sign (¦ P¡¦ T) = sign(w T ¡wP¡ bC1 + r) < 0 ; sincew T ·wP:
So, the…rmchoosestheminimalrenewalrateincentive-compatible.
4.2 Proofoflemma2
Proof. : ²A systemwithonlyPCs isanequilibrium i¤:
¦P(bwP)¸¦ T(wmin;R ¤;¦ P(bwP)): (26)
²A two-tiersystem isanequilibrium i¤ :
¦ T(wmin;R ¤;¦P(ewP))¸¦ P(ewP): (27 )
Condition(26) issatis…edi¤ wmin¸ bw¤p () wmin¸m :
Condition (27 ) is satis…ed i¤ wmin· ew ¤p () wmin· m ¡¯wmin1¡¯ ()
wmin·m .
4.3 Proofofproposition2
Proof. : From lemma2: foreveryvalueofwmintheequilibrium isde…ned
asfollows:
²ifwmin< m ; thetwo-tiersystem isanequilibrium.²ifwmin= m ;anyofthetwosystemscanbeanequilibrium.²ifwmin> m ; thesystemwithonlyPCsisanequilibrium.
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4.4 Proofoflemma3




and eL = eaN [b+ (1¡b)R ¤]
b+ ea [b+ (1¡b)R ¤]:





Fromequation(24), ea¤= X (1 + r)
1¡X ;where
X ´ J¡¯ bJ
[(wmin¡e)(1 + r)+ (1¡b)R ¤K ](1¡¯)and bJ´J¡(m ¡wmin)(1+
r):
T hedi¤erenceinemploymentinthetwosystems isgivenby:
sign(LP¡eL) = sign(a¤¡ea¤[b+ (1¡b)R ¤]);whereea¤= ea¤(wmin):
Ifwmin= w¤min=) hLP¡eL(w¤min)i = 0 , where
w¤min=
K M Jr + r¯JK (1¡b)(1¡R ¤)+ K M m (1 + r)2 ¯ + J(J+ e(1 + r)+ Kb)
(1 + r)[J+ ¯M K (1 + r)]
;
whereM = b+ (1¡b)R ¤:
So,²ifwmin> w¤min; LP > eL:²ifwmin< w¤min; LP < eL.
4.5 ProofofProposition3
Proof. :²From L emma3, ifwmin> w¤min=) LP > eL:²Tocheckiftheminimumwageconstraintisbindinginthesystemwith
onlypermanentcontracts, bw¤P¡w ¤minneedstobecalculated.
sign( bw¤P¡w¤min) = sign(m ¡w¤min) =
sign
"
m (1 + r)J¡m (1 + r)2K M ¯ ¡K M J(1¡¯)r¡K M m (1 + r)2 ¡JK r¯ ¡J(J+ e(1 + r)+ Kb)
#
=
sign [J(J+ K r¡J)¡JK r (M (1¡¯)+ ¯)]=
sign [JK r(1¡¯)(1¡M )]=
sign [JK r(1¡¯)(1¡b)(1¡R ¤)]> 0:




²From proposition 2, the system with PCs only is an equilibrium if
wmin> m :From lemma3, employmentinis this system ishigherifwmin>
w¤min:Fromproposition3, m > w¤min. T hisimpliesthatwheneverthesystem
withPCsonlyisanequilibrium, employmentisalwayshigherinthatsystem.²Fromproposition2, thetwo-tiersystem isanequilibrium ifwmin< m :
From lemma3, ifwmin2 (w¤min;m ) employmentis lowerin this system.
T hereforeitis this samerangeofwminforwhichthetwo-tiersystem is an
equilibriumdespitethefactthatemploymentinthetwo-tiersystem islower
andtheminimum wageconstraintis notbindingin thesystem withonly
PCs.
4.7 P roofofProposition5

















) = sign [¡(m ¡wmin)(wmin¡e + (1¡b)e=q)]:
Forallthecaseswherethetwo-tiersystemisanequilibrium, m ¡wmin> 0:
From Proposition1 itispossibletowrite: wmin= e¡(1¡b)e=q+ A;where
A > 0 in case 2 (andA · 0 in case 1). T herefore, @ea
@F

































w T ¡e + (1¡b)R K1 + r
!
(1 + r)














(3) wP:¸3¡¸ 4LP = 0
(4) w T :¸5¡¸3 a1 + r + a ¡¸ 4 LT = 0
²Conditions (3) and(4) implythateither¸3 = ¸ 4 = ¸5 = 0 or¸3 > 0 ;
¸ 4 > 0 ;and¸5 > 0:T he…rstcaseimpliesacontradiction(from(2), R would
benegative). T hereforethesemultipliersarepositiveimplyingthatthethree
constraintsassociatedarebinding.




J¡ bJ+ K (r + M )(1¡®):




JK r(1¡¯)(1¡M )+ JK
Ã




(1 + r)(1¡M )[J+ Kb(1 + ® r)] ;
where
M = b+ (1¡b)R ¤:
So, whenwmin2 [w¤¤min;m ], thesociallye¢cientrenewalrateof…xed-term
contracts is 1:²From Proposition3:
m ¡w ¤min= JK r(1¡¯)(1¡M )(1 + r)[J+ K¯M (1 + r)]:
T herefore,
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